The Year Democracy Is Tested: Why 2026 could become a turning point for American democracy

A year into the Trump administration, the architecture of American democracy shows signs of deliberate weakening. Media outlets face systematic pressure. The Department of Justice has become a tool for targeting political opponents. Legal residents are detained and deported without due process. Military pageantry and self-glorifying monuments mirror the aesthetics of authoritarian regimes worldwide.

President Trump’s nationally televised address on December 17, 2025 reinforced these trends rather than dispelling them. Framed as a defense of “law and order,” the speech relied heavily on the language of internal enemies, crisis, and national emergency—hallmarks of authoritarian consolidation. Rather than distinguishing between peaceful dissent and criminal activity, the address collapsed the two, portraying protest itself as a threat to the state.

The lower courts and upcoming elections remain bulwarks against democratic collapse—for now. Within a year, both could be compromised.

Border enforcement has morphed into a mechanism for political intimidation. National Guard and military units patrol Democratic strongholds: Los Angeles, Portland, Chicago. Left-leaning organizations have been designated domestic terrorist groups—a modern enemies list, legally codified. Republican-led states face pressure to gerrymander districts before 2026; Democrats respond in kind, accelerating a redistricting arms race that threatens to predetermine electoral outcomes before voters ever reach the polls.

The President’s remarks signaled that this approach is not temporary. By repeatedly invoking the need for “extraordinary measures” and praising the expanded domestic role of security forces, the address normalized a vision of governance in which civilian politics increasingly yields to coercive power.

The specter of electoral violence compounds these structural threats. Fear, not law, may suppress turnout. The Electoral College already distances voters from presidential selection; partisan gerrymandering now threatens to hollow out congressional and state elections entirely.

Consider the unthinkable: elections could be postponed. While protests in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Portland remain peaceful—as do the “No Kings” demonstrations—Republican leaders persistently label participants as “terrorists.” History teaches that authoritarian leaders invoke emergencies to justify extraordinary measures. Military “security” at polling places could effectively militarize the electoral process. Though unlikely, this possibility reveals how quickly democratic norms collapse once institutional guardrails fail.

The December 17, 2025 address subtly advanced this logic. By suggesting that unrest—real or anticipated—may require decisive executive action, the President laid rhetorical groundwork for future claims that normal democratic processes cannot safely proceed.

The authoritarian playbook is predictable. Leaders who gain power through legitimate elections follow a well-worn path.

Algeria’s Bouteflika won democratically in 1999 with 74% support. Twenty years later, facing protests against his fifth-term bid, he canceled elections indefinitely. Tunisia’s Saied suspended parliament in 2021 and repeatedly postponed elections; when finally held, turnout barely reached 11%. Uganda’s Museveni has delayed local elections for two decades, citing various emergencies. Serbia’s Milošević pioneered the modern template—canceling unfavorable results, forcing re-runs, and refusing to recognize opposition victories when his party lost local elections in 1996.

More sophisticated authoritarians maintain electoral schedules while gutting electoral integrity. Turkey’s Erdoğan forced Istanbul to re-vote when his party lost. Hungary’s Orbán holds punctual elections with predetermined outcomes. Nicaragua’s Ortega imprisoned opposition candidates while keeping election dates. El Salvador’s Bukele suspends civil liberties through perpetual emergencies while maintaining electoral theater.

The pattern is unmistakable: modern authoritarians prefer rigged elections to canceled ones. Postponement becomes necessary only when facing existential threats—mass protests, power consolidation crises, or active conflicts. Leaders who begin with genuine popularity gradually view themselves as indispensable. They fear prosecution upon leaving office.

In the United States, a strong showing by the Democrats in 2026 could reopen the possibility of another impeachment proceeding against President Trump. This prospect could incentivize further manipulation of electoral and legal processes, creating a dangerous feedback loop where fear of accountability drives deeper authoritarian measures.

President Trump’s December 17, 2025 address hinted at precisely this dynamic. By casting opposition victories not as legitimate democratic outcomes but as threats to national stability, the President implicitly questioned the legitimacy of electoral accountability itself.

Scholars term this gradual erosion “competitive authoritarianism”—democracy in form but not function. The sequence is consistent: capture institutions, manipulate constitutions, restrict media, harass opposition, rig elections. When these measures fail, postpone or cancel elections entirely.

The warning signs are manifest: politicized law enforcement, targeted repression, systematic gerrymandering, attacks on civil society. Each step enables the next. Incremental erosion is reversible; crisis is not.

Protecting democracy demands immediate action: defend judicial independence, safeguard electoral infrastructure, and resist every attempt to compromise free elections. Citizens, institutions, and political leaders must recognize that democracy’s greatest vulnerability lies in the assumption of its permanence.

The international examples aren’t cautionary tales from distant lands—they’re blueprints. The same forces that dismantled democracy in Algeria, Turkey, and Hungary operate here, now. The difference lies not in our exceptionalism but in our response.

Time remains, but not much. Democracy doesn’t die in darkness; it dies in broad daylight, one “emergency measure” at a time, while citizens debate whether the threat is real. By the time the question is settled, the answer no longer matters.

The future of American democracy depends on understanding this: authoritarianism doesn’t announce itself. It arrives over time through legal channels, claims popular mandates, and wraps itself in the flag. It succeeds when good people assume it can’t happen here.

It can. It is. The only question is whether we’ll stop it.

A Case for Comprehensive Nonpartisan Citizen Election Observation in the US

The credibility of elections in the United States has been challenged in recent years. Allegations of widespread fraud that can undermine the credibility of the electoral process are used as a pretext to change voting requirements or dispute the results for partisan gain. Having observed elections overseas, I have witnessed firsthand how such allegations can be detrimental. My own experience, global best practices, and public surveys in the US indicate that the introduction of a more comprehensive nonpartisan observation of elections in the US would have a significant positive impact on public trust in elections.

While partisan poll watchers affiliated with a political party or candidate are looking out for their party or candidate’s interests, nonpartisan citizen election observers gather data about an election to determine whether it was credible and fair. Such an observation needs to be grounded in facts and evidence and conducted in an impartial and objective manner by trained observers who can help validate the work of election officials in important ways. Further, it has the potential to determine whether the election was peaceful and help prevent violence by confirming that the elections followed the law and by exposing the scope of any irregularities.

Based on my experience, comprehensive and effective nonpartisan observation requires several things. First, it must be permitted in all jurisdictions. Second, observers, whether long-term or short-term, cannot be party advocates and need to be willing and able to stay impartial. Finally, the observation effort must be extensive, with an observation scope broad enough to collect and analyze sufficient data into an observer report and using a methodology that accounts for the idiosyncrasies of the electoral jurisdictions in each state.

In the United States, partisan poll watchers are widely allowed, but not all states provide or allow for nonpartisan, neutral observers, and many do not provide for international observers which can add a layer of neutrality as they are not politically affiliated with political parties or candidates in the US. It is crucial that all states have a legal framework in place that also provides procedures for accrediting and deploying nonpartisan observers. According to the Movement Advancement Project, 38 states and the District of Columbia allow for some form of domestic, nonpartisan observation. However, such observation may be limited to being outside the polling station or to a certain polling location or time, preventing observers from fulfilling their key role.

When identifying nonpartisan, neutral observers, steps must be taken to ensure that they leave their partisan views at the door. I find it to be an important best practice to have each observer agree with and sign a code of conduct, and to train them prior to deployment. Along with the legal background and an overview of the political landscape, such training orients them to their roles and responsibilities, the voting process in the jurisdiction they will be observing, how to observe, and how to collect and report their findings.

It is common international practice to distinguish between long-term and short-term observers, as well as between domestic and international observers. Whether domestic or international, long-term observers, which also includes the core team of observers, focus on the pre-election developments and the broader electoral context—analyzing the political, legal, and procedural context leading up to the election, and on preparing training materials and logistics for short-term observers. Short-term observers, typically a larger cohort than long-term observers, concentrate on what happens during the election, such as early voting, Election Day polling, and the vote count and results announcement or even certification. While international observers are more challenging to recruit due to travel and deployment logistics, language or knowledge of local context, and related costs, they are often seen as more neutral and tend to be deployed in complex political situations where domestic observers may be perceived as biased even when they act in an impartial manner.

Observers are typically deployed in small observation teams. Often, observer teams are unable to cover all the polling stations at the same time. In such cases, they visit multiple polling stations in each electoral jurisdiction. It is important to maximize coverage and avoid overlapping by ensuring that the teams have a deployment strategy that enables them to cover the desired number of polling stations.

Each observer team collects data on a standardized form based on questions about the electoral process, to which they can add general observations or anything noteworthy. I find real time reporting using appropriate technology a particularly useful observation practice for identifying issues in a timely manner. Observer findings feed into the analysis typically performed by a core group of observers which analyzes individual observers’ findings. These findings are then used to make broader, well-informed conclusions which are issued in occasional statements and the final report with recommendations. To maintain consistency and messaging, no individual observer or team should be allowed to make or issue statements or conclusions based on one or even a smaller, unrepresentative number of observer reports which may reflect isolated developments or incidents.

It is another best practice and extremely important that observation efforts are comprehensive. By organizing nonpartisan citizen election observation in a numerically and demographically relevant sample, findings reported by each state can be compared and contrasted to identify strengths and weaknesses of each process and to make recommendations for ensuring safe, secure, and credible elections that reflect the will of the voters.

I find that, ideally, nonpartisan election observation works best when a coalition of neutral, objective organizations, including academic institutions, come together. Building that coalition takes time, and Civic Hub US is committed to piloting an observation effort that can be scaled up to cover more of the country. Ultimately, given the deep divisions among the two main parties in the US and potential perceptions of political affiliation by citizen observers, we also see an important role for international observers.